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I talked to Marshall about the preparation of S-1 and he gave us a bad picture of the rainy season weather in Japan at this time and said that one thing that might militate against our attack was the low ceiling and heavy clouds, although there were breaks and good days in between.

After the conference I took a short drive with Colonel Kyle accompanied by Captain Gabilia, Russian interpreter, past the Potsdam marshalling yards to the Schloss Cecilienhof. This Schloss was where the meetings of the present Conference were held. The drive was a refreshing one.

In the evening I received a telegram from Harrison giving me the exact dates as far as possible when they expected to have S-1 ready, and I answered it with a further question as to further future dates of the possibility of accumulation of supplies.

Tuesday, July 24, 1945.

At nine-twenty I went to "The Little White House" and was at once shown into the President's room where he was alone with his work, and he told me about the events of yesterday's meeting with which he seemed to be very well satisfied. I then told him of my conference with Marshall and the implication that could be inferred as to his feeling that the Russians were not needed. I also told the President of the question which Marshall had suggested might be put to Stalin as to the Americans going home, and he said that he would do that this afternoon at the end of the hearing, but he told me that there had been a meeting called by Leahy of the Military Staffs to meet either this afternoon or I think tomorrow morning.

The President was frank about his desire to close the Conference and get away. He told me Churchill was going away Wednesday and was coming

Give H.T. date of S1 operations
Tell H.T. of importance of Emperor in warning - Byrnes brief
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back Friday, and that he hoped to get the whole thing closed up and get away either Sunday or Monday. I told him that I thought I had done all that I could see in sight, and that as Churchill was going away, I was thinking of going down to see Patton's troops in Bavaria for a day or so and then, if he did not telegraph me that he would like me to come back, I thought I would go on home. He said that arrangement was perfectly agreeable to him and, if he wanted to have me come back, he would let me know at Patton's.

I then showed him the telegram which had come last evening from Harrison giving the dates of the operations. He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning. He said he had just sent his warning to Chiang Kai-shek to see if he would join in it, and as soon as that was cleared by Chiang he, Truman, would release the warning and that would fit right in time with the program we had received from Harrison.

I then spoke of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the continuance of their dynasty, and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning was important and might be just the thing that would make or mar their acceptance, but that I had heard from Byrnes that they preferred not to put it in, and that now such a change was made impossible by the sending of the message to Chiang. I hoped that the President would watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point. He said that he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it.

We had a few words more about the S-1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets. He again reiterated

See Stalin

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with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria.

Wednesday, July 25, 1945

This morning I learned that I had been invited to meet Stalin at his quarters at the meeting place of the Conference, so with Mr. Page who acted as my interpreter I went there at twelve-fifteen. We were ushered in to the Schloss Cecilienhof where the conferences have taken place, and on my way to Stalin's room I passed through the conference room where one of the intermediary conferences was already taking place. Molotov who was there greeted me and also Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Ambassador to the United States. Molotov introduced a Mr. Pavlov who was also there.

After just a few words with them I went on through some more corridors until I was ushered into Stalin's room. He came and greeted me cordially and showed me a seat in front of his desk where he then took his seat, and I had a short talk with him, the minutes of which I afterwards dictated and which are attached hereto. Stalin impressed me as older than I thought he would look and the impressive part of him was a very large head.

I then went back to lunch and immediately after lunch we took the C-54 for Munich. On arrival there I was met by General Patton and General Gay